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In the twentieth century, the
United Nations became one of the main
sources of legitimacy informing the
relation between states. Although the
rules and principles guiding
international politics have never been
static or centralized within a single
institution, they have often been
presented as universal expressions of
the will of the people (we, the people of
the United Nations) and expressed
through the different agendas of this
international organization. By
identifying and regulating what
constitutes the exception to the rule
and to international peace and security,
the permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) are
positioned as the ones defining the
limits of normality in international
politics. Developing further on an
interpretation of the UNSC as a
sovereign decision-maker, this paper
explores its role in the universalization
of certain rules and principles, arguing
that the campaign for a reform of the
organ sheds light on the political domain
of the 'international order'.
The campaign for a reform of
the UNSC has the potential to re-
politicize the international to the extent
that the position of the five permanent
members as the legitimate authorities
deciding on the exception gets
challenged. Evoking Schmitt’s
conception of the political and against
the argument about the dissolution of
the 'political' into the liberal normative
framework, we show how the campaign
for a reform of the UNSC opens up the
space for the contestation: (1) of the
rules for the creation of rules that guide
the conduct of the states; and (2) of the
subjectivities constituted and reinforced
within these rules.
The paper is divided into three
parts. In the first section, we lay down
the theoretical framework that will
guide our interpretation of the United
Nations Security Council as the
sovereign of our international system.
First, we discuss Schmitt's concept of
the political, his definition of
sovereignty and the relationship
between sovereignty and norm.
Additionally, we explore the debate
between Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen
on the relation between politics and the
legal order, introducing also Agamben´s
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contribution to the subject. Lastly, we
suggest that Schmitt offers an
oversimplified account of politics that
overlooks the continuation of politics
beyond his narrow conceptualization of
sovereignty.
In the second section, we bring
Schmitt's definition of politics and
sovereignty to the international level.
We explain the existence of an
international law and the reasons why
the UNSC may be interpreted as holding
the kind of sovereignty Schmitt defines.
In the last part of this paper we show
how the campaign for a reform of the
UNSC exposes the relevant political
power of the organ and the necessity to
reevaluate its constituency.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the
understanding of the political in
Schmittian terms may have its
limitations if it disregards deeper
implications of the structures of power
that goes beyond the direct relationship
between the sovereign and its subjects,
and the friend/enemy dichotomy. We
also highlight further research agendas
that could contribute to this debate and
deepen our understanding of the
international order.
Politics, Norms and Power
When the United Nations was
created in 1945, after the Second World
War, the liberal thought that guided the
reconstruction of the international
order after the First World War – in
which the League of Nations was
emblematic – was considered, to some
extent, obsolete. For its critics, the
League’s structure was considered to be
fragile and over-reliant on the good will
of its members. The League relied on
consensus as the decision-making
procedure and had no mechanism to
enforce or punish misconducts. In 1939,
the belief on a harmony of interests
between states became a dead end, and
more pragmatic accounts of
international politics started to gain
strength and visibility (see CARR, 2001).
If after the First World War the world
was embedded in the Wilsonian
idealistic interpretation of the public
opinion and the triumph of rationality,
the global order in the aftermath of the
Second World War challenged these
premises. Therefore, this context was
marked by a renewal of realism.
Central to a realist
interpretation of 'politics' is its
expression through the state. For
Weber, politics is an extremely broad
concept and includes "every kind of
independent leadership activity"
(WEBER, 2004, p.32), while the state "is
the form of human community that
(successfully) lays claim to the
monopoly of legitimate physical
violence within a particular territory"
(WEBER, 2004, p.33). He further
defines the state as the "source of the
'right' to use violence". Therefore, in the
realm of politics, we find "the strive for
a share of power or to influence the
distribution of power, whether between
states or between groups of people
contained within a state” (WEBER, 2004,
p.33).
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The distinction between use of
violence and 'legitimate use of violence'
affords a distinction between friends
and enemies. As expressed in Locke
(1988, p.419):
Whosoever uses force without right, as
everyone does in society, who does it
without law, puts himself into a state of
war with those, against whom he so
uses it, and in that state all former ties
are cancelled, all other rights cease, and
everyone has a right to defend himself
and to resist the aggressor.
By putting himself against the
authority of the sovereign, one resists
power in the realm of civil politics. The
friend-enemy distinction will be drawn
at the limits between the civil and
sovereign politics. The leader of a
political organization (in this case, the
state) not only has the right to use
force, but to rule over people in a
specific territory. The use of force must
be legitimate. Then, an important
question concerns the source of this
right to rule assigned to the sovereign.
According to Weber (2004, p.34), the
range of justifications for the
“legitimate” rule may include:
First, authority of 'the eternal past', of
custom, sanctified by a validity that
extends back into the mists of time as is
perpetuated by habit. (...) Second, there
is the authority of the extraordinary,
personal gift of grace or charisma. (...)
Lastly, there is the rule by virtue of
'legality', by virtue of the belief in the
validity of legal statuses and practical
'competence' based on rational rules.
Especially relevant for this
analysis is the legitimacy that derives
from the validity of “legal statuses and
practical competence”. Usually, the
validity of the legal system itself is
derived by an appeal to custom or an
eternal past, in which case the memory
of the creation of the rule disappears in
the process of fixing the rule in an
abstract place and time in tradition.
In contrast, Schmitt argues that
the preservation of law is itself an act of
validating it. Sovereignty is "the locus
and nature of the agency that
constitutes a political system"
(SCHMITT, 1985, p.xi). Offering a
different definition of politics from the
one offered by Weber, Schmitt claims
that what defines the sovereign is not
simply the monopoly to coerce or to
rule, but the monopoly over the last
decision. According to Schmitt, the
nature of the sovereign is the making of
“genuine decision” (SCHMITT, 1985,
p.3). The sovereign is in a position not
only to determine the existence of a
condition that is not anticipated by the
norm as well as deciding on the
appropriate measures to deal with this
exception (SCHMITT, 1985, p.xii). The
genuineness of the sovereign decision
relies on the fact that it does not derive
from the norm, as a general norm,
"represented by an ordinary legal
prescription, can never encompass a
total exception" (SCHMITT, 1985, p.13).
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The sovereign, and not the general
norm, can be held responsible for the
situation in its totality. It is through the
exception that the essence of norm and
authority is revealed. In a sense, sovereignty
is legitimized by the legal norm that
prescribes its authority, while at the same
time it proves to be independent of the law
that authorized it (SCHMITT, 1985, p.13).
Concerning this distinction between
sovereignty and the norm, Schmitt argues
that "although he (sovereign) stands outside
the normally valid legal system, he
nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who
must decide whether the constitution needs
to be suspended in its entirety" (SCHMITT,
1985, p.7). The essence of sovereign
authority is the 'right' to make decisions
without the need to be based on any law.
Therefore, the exception makes relevant the
subject of sovereignty. In addition, Schmitt
explains that the precise details of an
emergency cannot be predicted. One cannot
tell, when, where, what or whether an
emergency is going to happen. Also, "not
every extraordinary measure, not every
police emergency measure or emergency
decree, is necessarily an exception. What
will characterize an exception is principally
unlimited authority" (SCHMITT, 1985, p.12),
as the exception, or emergency, may
demand the suspension of the entire
existing order. In this context, Schmitt then
argues that the exception is more interesting
than the rule. According to him the rule
proves nothing; the exception proves
everything: it confirms not only the rule but
also its existence, which derives only from
the exception. One can only have the
exception if one has the rule. Therefore, the
designation of something as an exception is
in fact an assertion of the nature and the
quality of the rule. It is clear for Schmitt that
when the sovereign identifies an exception,
is at the same time reinforcing what
constitutes the public order and security,
and therefore, the “normal” situation.
Deriving from that argument, for Schmitt,
every legal order will be based on a political
decision. By the same token, every political
decision is enabled by its autonomy in
relation to the pre-existing norm. Once an
exception is determined, defined and
interpreted, the resolution to solve this
specific situation may become part of the
normative arrangement, and will be no
longer an exception since it finds specific
prescriptions in the norm. The legal order,
then, contains necessarily norm and decision
(SCHMITT, 1985, p.10).
Schmitt contends that resolute
action was necessary to combat threats, for
the state's raison d'être was to maintain its
integrity in order to ensure order and
stability (SCHMITT, 1985, xiii). Through the
definition of what is regular and normal in
opposition to what is different and alien, the
sovereign will also distinguish friends and
enemies (SCHMITT, 1996, p.27). Regular
jurisdiction deals with recognizable cases
and subjects, while extraordinary politics
invariably calls for the identification of an
enemy, a threat whose elimination is
necessary for the reestablishment of peace
and security. In those cases, the enemy’s
annihilation could be understood as the
result of an extreme level contained in the
friend-enemy distinction in which the enemy
is the Other who embodies an ontological
denial of the Self.
Moreover, Schmitt's concept of the
political emphasizes the notion of human
agency behind any notion of 'normality' and
'order'. Instead of a normative system
emanated from an abstract idea of the
'general will', diffuse interpretations and
decisions concerning the law taken at the
juridical level, by bureaucrats or a set of
other institutions, Schmitt argues that
decisions and judgments are always
necessary to the degree one desires to
preserve the political.
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One of the problems Schmitt
identifies in modern political culture is the
disappearance of the “political” realm.
According to him, modern society
(financiers, industrial technicians, Marxist
socialists, and anarchic-syndicalist
revolutionaries) "unite in demanding that
the biased rule of politics over unbiased
economic management be done away
with". In this sense, "there must no longer
be political problems, only organizational-
technical and economic-sociological tasks"
(SCHMITT, 1985, p.65). Schmitt's diagnosis
was that increasingly “the plant” runs by
itself, and consequently, "the decisionistic
and personalistic elements in the concept of
sovereignty are lost" (SCHMITT, 1985, p.48).
A similar perspective is found in Weber, who
argues that the disenchantment of the
world is related to the disappearance of
politics, and also rejects this liberal fiction of
a self-sustained social order (KALYVAS,
2008, p.38).
Following from this de-politization
process, man's desire to rationalize, control,
regulate and explain political phenomena
scientifically led to the dissolution of politics
(separation between politics and the other
fields - economics, law, culture etc.). In the
forties, Hans Kelsen offered a divergent
perspective on the relation between norm
and politics that later came to support what
we can interpret as the “de-politicization” of
the international, in the sense that politics
and the norm came to be distinguished as
two separate realms. Kelsen defended the
pure theory of law as detached from
ideologies and human agency. He rejected
the notion that norms were the mere
reflection of political decisions. According to
Kelsen (1945, p.xvi),
It is precisely by its anti-ideological character
that the pure theory of law proves itself a
true science of law. Science as cognition has
always the immanent tendency to unveil its
object. But political ideology veils reality
either by transfiguring reality in order to
conserve and defend it, or by disfiguring
reality in order to attack, to destroy, or to
replace it by another reality. Every political
ideology has its root in volition, not in
cognition; in the emotional, not in the
rational, element of our consciousness; it
arises from certain interests, or rather, from
interests other than the interest of truth.
The view we support in this paper
is that the “political” has not disappeared,
but instead, the sources of legitimation of
political authority have changed. Schmitt’s
narrow definition of the political emphasizes
the individual and overlooks the potential
strengthening of the political enabled
exactly by the alleged dissolution of the
political into the norm. The totality of the
pure theory of law ignores the impossibility
of the doctrine of law to encompass the
total exception. Thus, we should keep in
mind that the legal doctrine cannot
anticipate and pretend to have an answer to
any crisis that might emerge. Judgments are
constantly demanded, but they might not
be perceived as such if one insists to conceal
human judgment and decision within a
normative structure. To ignore decision-
making is to legitimize the structure of
power that constitutes the “political”, now
masqueraded under discourses of universal
rights and democracy. The onslaught against
the political is based on the fact that the
recognition of the human agency behind the
normative order enables one to identify the
asymmetric relations of power ruling the
creation of the norm and the reproduction
of the so-called normative order.
As Weber suggested, "whereas
during normal politics actors aim at
appropriating the means of violence within
a given structure of legitimacy, during
extraordinary politics they aim at creating
the belief in this legitimacy by disseminating
those norms that will
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justify authority" (KALYVAS, 2008, p.41).
With this in mind, we can infer that the
aim to unveil the human character of
politics is hindered by the sovereign (the
one in the position to free itself from
the norm in a state of exception) who
wishes to legitimize his authority
between the norm and its suspension,
but who recognizes that the notion of
power is now interpreted in the
opposite side of legitimacy, as Kelsen
(1945, p.xvii) asserts,
In the Anglo-American world, where
freedom of science continues to be
respected and where political power is
better stabilized than elsewhere, ideas
are in greater esteem than power; and
also with the hope that even on the
European continent, after its liberation
from political tyranny, the younger
generation will be won over to the ideal
of an independent science of law; for the
fruit of such a science can never be lost.
As Kelsen points out, in our
society, ideas are in greater esteem than
power. The legitimacy of sovereignty is
given by “the people” and created
through the notion that political
authority and the will of its subjects are
indistinguishable. For Schmitt, these
counterrevolutionary philosophers of
the State heightened the decision-
making process to such an extent that
"the notion of the legitimacy, their
starting point, was finally dissolved"
(SCHMITT, 1985, p.65). Although the
point in this paper is not to discuss the
micro levels of power, we must say that
by denying the political and the biases
of the norm, and by denying the political
as underlying all those other fields in
society, one is actually reassuring the
continuation of the political by other
means, perhaps not in the persona of a
determined sovereign who decides on
the exception, but still in decisions on
the exception taken on a daily basis at
different levels in society. On a different
direction, and more important for the
purpose of this paper, we might also
recognize the persistence of the
sovereign potentially hidden behind
overestimated ideas and principles,
trying to muddle itself with the norm.
Whenever we are compelled to see this
“order” as legitimate because of the
alleged universalization of principles
that “we, people” of this world are
convinced we all agreed upon, we fail to
recognize the political (which involves
decisions and judgments) at work in the
constitution and reproduction of the
international normative order.
The limitations of the Schmittian
account of politics relies on the fact that
(1) he narrows down the realm of
politics to the relation between a
government and its subjects, and (2) he
seems to argue that the re-politicization
of the political sphere, bringing back a
visible and identifiable agent to the
decision-making process, is an end in
itself. Although he acknowledges that
law is an overall system of power that
functions as a productive normalizing
force, it does not seem that he is trying
to “denormalize” it. In other worlds, the
more depoliticized a political order is,
https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/sg 20
the more political it becomes. However,
a re-politicization expressed by a simple
reintroduction of the “human element”
of irrational decisionism may not the
best way to challenge the obfuscation of
the political by the “rule of law”. As
Giorgio Agamben (1998, p.12) contends,
"the problem of sovereignty [in Schmitt]
was reduced to the question of who
within the political order was invested
with certain powers, and the very
threshold of the political order itself was
never called into question". Agamben,
then, further analyzes the role played by
the exception on social relations, such
as the constitution of the Homo Sacer,
the one who is so dehumanized that no
guilt comes from its annihilation.
For Schmitt (1985, p.1), the
sovereign is "he who decides on the
exception". The purpose of any
sovereign decision will be the
reinstatement of order, either of the old
order threatened by chaos, or a new
judicial order able to reestablish
“normality”. Despite the fact that
Schmitt does not further explore the
implications of power, one must
acknowledge the relevance of his theory
for an analysis of politics, in the sense
that it sheds light on the relation
between politics and the normative
structure that both enables politics and
is constituted by politics.
The depoliticization of relations
of power, a concern highlighted by
Schmitt and Weber, is indeed a
problem. Asymmetries and hierarchical
relations of power do not disappear
with the disappearance of the image of
the sovereign. Recognizing the
“political” in the “depoliticized” modern
world is the first step to denaturalize it.
In agreement with Clifford Geertz,
Shapiro (1998, p.16) states that "the
delusion with politics is the result of our
aggressiveness. We are too 'impressed
with command'. We look so hard for
direct relations of power that 'we see
little else'". In our view, even
‘command’ may be overlooked when it
is disguised in the name of
representation, or principles other than
power.
There is nothing about truth in
any normative order, but about
decisions and judgments, as Schmitt
emphasizes. The normative order is
nothing more than a representation of
“normality” and “security” in contrast to
representations of the opposite - chaos,
disorder, and threat. According to
Shapiro (1988, p.21), "once human
enactments are banished from the
value- and - meaning-creation process,
the effect is depoliticizing, for the
assumption that a discursive mode
delivers truth, rather than being one




and international normative order
reveals that while sovereign States are
considered to be the main actors to
delineate the political realm, they are
also understood and defined within the
political (SCHMITT, 1985, p.xv). If there
is an international structure or order
defined by an international law, and if
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one accepts Schmitt's assumption that
no law can encompass a total exception,
one might question the locus of the
political in the international realm.
"Who is responsible [in the international
system], for that for which competence
has not been anticipated?" (SCHMITT,
1985, p.10). To identify sovereignty in
the international sphere is to discuss the
historical and geographical sources of
“normalized” international principles. As
Shapiro (1988, p.37) explains:
Insofar as existing legal codes represent
historical political victories, the
language of the law reflects the
institutionalization of some values and
interests and not others. Assuming that
prior to institutionalization there exists,
under most circumstances, a plurality of
different value and interest positions,
each of which would have given us a
different legal discourse, the existing
laws lack depth insofar as the diversity
of demands and struggles prior to their
emergence cannot be read in the
univocal code.
Kelsen (1945, p.xvi) argues that
"the political authority creating the law
and, therefore, wishing to conserve it,
may doubt whether a purely scientific
cognition of its products, free from any
political ideology, is desirable". As we
argued before, the sovereign has not
disappeared. Power still impress, as
Geertz and Shapiro point out, but one
might agree with Kelsen that sovereign
power, as the subject with unrestricted
power, is not easily esteemed and
a leader, may be even freer to act within
and above the law if one is convinced of
the unity between power and popular
will, between authority and Law,
between international political decision
making and the principles that shapes its
structure.
To this notion of a hegemonic
value as the source of legitimation of
decision-making, Kalyvas (2008, p.35)
asserts, drawing from Wolfgang
Schluchter (1985) that the belief in the
legitimacy of domination is directly
extracted and conditioned by the
prevailing hegemonic cultural values.
Those who are able to determine the
content and orientation of a cultural
formation have a higher probability of
influencing how people act and
determing what In a given society wil be
considered to be a legitimate authority.
In this section, we explored the
relationship between power politics and
the constitution of normative structures.
Building upon Schmitt’s interpretation
of the political, we argued that the
political realm – the realm of genuine
decision-making and judgment beyond
the established norm, could hardly
disappear from international politics; it
could have instead adapted over history
to an evolving order that had the United
Nations as a major center of norm and
legitimacy production on behalf of “we,
the people”. In order to illustrate our
view, in the next section we explore the




Centuries after the Treaty of
Westphalia, the international order still
operates based on sovereign states that
embody both Weberian and Schmittian
definitions of content, rule, and power.
Conceived as sovereign entities which
are constantly interacting in an
anarchical system, forms to regulate
these interactions have been
progressively introduced. Even though
these regulatory mechanisms have been
historically in operation, the formation
of an international organization to
regulate and mediate states’ interaction
is a relative novelty in the international
system. The first account of an
organization that claimed universality
was the League of Nations. Three
decades after its creation, under the
spell of Versailles’ idealism, the Second
World War erupted and questioned all
the League’s principles regarding
collective security.
After the shocking image of
nuclear bombs being employed in
Japan’s soil, it suddenly became clear
that if a new organization was to exist, it
should correct the League’s failures in
preventing another global conflict. As
we pointed out in the introduction, the
League was structured according to the
liberal conception of the international
advocated by the U.S. President,
Woodrow Wilson. In the famous
document “Fourteen Points”, Wilson
established that a new international
organization would be a central
element to prevent another global
conflict. The Pact of the League of
Nations, signed in the optimistic
atmosphere of the Treaty of Versailles,
was later considered almost naïve. First
of all, the United States itself refused to
ratify the Pact: the U.S. Congress
contradicted Wilson’s ideals and
considered that it was not in the
country’s best interest to be involved in
foreign challenges. Also, the Pact
established the consensus as the sole
decision-making procedure and relied
on the self-restrain of each member to
comply to its rules. The result was an
organization that was paralyzed by
disagreements even in procedural
matters (ALBUQUERQUE, 2020, p.27).
Regarding the absence of a
mechanism to enforce its ruling, the
League was impassive when some of the
members defied its own principles. Carr
(2001, p.55) points out how, in 1931,
one could already identify the League’s
lack of effectivity: Japan, one of its most
powerful and central members, invaded
the Manchuria region, officially owned
by China. The League suspended the
offender, but it was as far as it could go.
The impunity and the lack of hard
sanctions also worked to drain the
organization’s legitimacy and, one by
one, the States started to withdrawal
their membership. The beginning of the
Second World War was the last straw.
When the war was already in
progress, the Allies converged on the
opinion that a new organization was
needed to shape the after-war-order
and that it required a different structure
from the League.
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This topic was pivotal in the
Moscow Conference and in the Tehran
Conference, both in 1943. In these
occasions, the United States, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom and China
started to brainstorm and draft the
goals and functions of the new
organization. They decided, for
example, that France should join them
in a restricted group of five powerful
countries that must be involved in any
security and military decisions [1]. This
centrality was reaffirmed at the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944),
when they wrote a preliminary version
of the future organization’s treaty, and
in the Yalta Conference, when Stalin
demanded that each one of them could
veto any security action that was against
its national interest (ALBUQUERQUE,
2020, p.28).
To accomplish that goal of
creating the organization, fifty
countries, mostly the ones that declared
war to the Axis, reunited in San
Francisco for two months. During the
San Francisco Conference, states
debated over the principles, structure
and function of the new organization:
The United Nations Organization. The
debates in the Eastern American coast
culminated in the United Nations
Charter. As any Charter, the treaty
signed in 1945 has an addressee: “the
peoples of the United Nations”. The
document maintained the liberal
principles of the international law, such
as the isonomy, the good will and the
sovereign equality, but we could affirm
that the UN reinterpreted them in a
more pragmatic way. Isonomy and
equality were some of the core
principles, but they also contemplated
some exceptions, and the UNSC’s
structure and decision-making process
are the best examples of this “pragmatic
turn”.
The UN Charter established the
organization’s six main bodies, including
one to specifically define and tackle
threats to peace and security. Although
there is no hierarchy between the six,
the Security Council has occupied the
central stage, due to the prerogatives
conferred to it by the UN Charter. The
United Nations Security Council is not "a
bureaucracy that builds up an
informational advantage in an issue
area. Instead, the delegation is first and
foremost to a decision-making rule"
(VOETEN, 2008, p.43). By ratifying the
United Nations Charter, all member
states delegate to the 5 permanent
members and 10 non-permanent
members the authority to make
decisions regarding collective responses
to threats to international peace and
security. These decisions, which are
generally binding under international
law, may include far-reaching measures
such as economic sanctions and military
interventions (VOETEN, 2008, p.43). In
his interpretation of the UNSC in 1946,
Kelsen (1946, p.1121) compared its
authority with the powers granted to a
sovereign State:
There is an open contradiction between
the political ideology of the United
Nations and its legal constitution. And
this contradiction may completely
https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/sg 24
paralyze the great advantage the
Charter tried to gain over the Covenant
by conferring upon the Security Council a
power almost equal to that of a
government.
Due to the broad acceptance
that the Charter has acquired over time
and the depth of its rights and duties,
there is a literature that compares it to a
kind of constitution of the international
system and identifies it as a framework
of international law. In this sense, the
legal provisions in the UN Charter are
compared to norms of jus cogens, a
legal term that designates imperative
norms that cannot have their obedience
contested and, therefore, would be
hierarchically superior to the ordinary
rules of international law (Hossain,
2005; Fassbender, 2009). The
comparison of the Charter with a
constitution and its approximation to
the norms of jus cogens indicate the
centrality that it acquired as a regulator
of the international system in the post-
Second War.
According to the UN Charter,
the UNSC have the following relevant
functions: a) to regulate disputes
between UN Member States (Articles 33
to 38), b) to regulate armaments (Art.
26); c) to act in cases of threat to peace
and aggression (Articles 39 to 51); d) to
decide on the measures to be taken in
relation to the judgments of the
International Court of Justice (art. 94, §
2). The article 25 in the UN Charter
establishes that "the members of the
United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present
Charter". It is worth noting that in this
article we find the norm that abides
every signatory member of the Charter
to the resolutions issued by the UNSC.
Cronin argues that "since the UN
Charter is legally binding on all
members, which also practically means
all states, the line between an
organizational mandate and general
principle of international law is blurred”
(CRONIN, 2008, p.60).
While article 34 in chapter VI
delegates to the Security Council the
responsibility to investigate any dispute
or situation that might endanger the
maintenance of international peace and
security, article 33, paragraph 1,
"obligates the parties to seek solutions,
by means of their own choice, of
disputes the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security”.
Those articles in chapter VI of
UN Charter annunciate the
responsibility of the Security Council to
investigate the cases of disputes that
have the potential to disturb the 'order',
but the source of UNSC sovereign
authority is found in article 39 that
establishes that
The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace
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and security.
Considering the fact that there
is no clear mandate for other
organization to review these
determinations, what the UNSC decides
is a threat, is by definition, a threat
(CRONIN, 2008, p.211). In the article 39
we find both conditions for the
definition of sovereignty, as defended
by Schmitt. The UNSC has the power not
only to determine the existence of a
threat to international security, as well
as to decide on the necessary measures
to reestablish international peace and
security. The deliberative organ has the
exclusive “right” to interpret the norm
and go beyond the established norm if
necessary.
On the nature of the decision-
making process in the UNSC, it is
necessary to classify the two kinds of
decisions that can be taken by this
political body, according to article 27 of
the UN Charter. To mere procedural
decisions, it suffices the affirmative
votes, with no prerogative extended to
the permanent members. To make
decisions concerning any other
substantial issue, the approval depends
on the affirmative vote of nine
members, including the affirmative vote
of all permanent members. From this
extra demand in voting procedures, we
conclude that the permanent members
have the so-called “veto power”. This is
the normative expression that grants
the power within the political body to a
specific group of States, not only to
decide on the exception and on the
measures to restore the order, but to
prevent any resolution that is not in
accordance with the 5 permanent
members' best interest.
Evoking Weber's definition of
the political, a feature of politics that
cannot be emphasized enough is the
struggle for power and the asymmetries
within the UNSC. Traditionally, the
United States, France and Britain make
their decisions in prior meetings, called
P3 instance, when they determine the
Western position. In the 2000s, after
their diplomatic approximation, Russia
and China have also been increasingly
coordinating positions prior to the UNSC
adoption meetings. Only later the five
permanent members reunite in petit
committee on so-called P5 instance.
There are therefore at least two rounds,
defined not only in time and space, but
also politically, which may result in
blockage of collective action, even
before it reaches the meeting of the
body (SEITENFUS, 2012, p.146).
Drawing on Sartori’s research
about small political groups, Baccarini
argues that the UNSC operates as a
committee, a structure that can be
defined by a small and closed group
with direct interaction within an
institutionalized and permanent
mechanism (BACCARINI, 2010, p.10).
Baccarini concludes that the
proliferation of informal groups and
negotiations has in fact generated the
emergence of a consensual standard
decision-making, where the ability to
influence results remains concentrated
in the P5. According to the author,
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These committees engage in
"committees’ subsystem" that allows, in
addition to internal payments, lateral
and external payments through other
committees in a coordination
mechanism. These side payments are
not necessarily negotiated explicitly and
may occur through the negotiation of
votes and early reactions to possible
decisions of a particular committee,
favoring adjustment and coordination.
(BACCARINI, 2010, p.10)
It results from this oligopolistic
format that effective decision-making is
confined to those who are capable of
providing lateral payments for the
support or opposition in any matter,
either inside the UNSC or in other
multilateral bodies. For Baccarini,
among the elements that have an
impact on the ability to influence the
norm-making process are the amount of
financial contribution to the
organization budget, the capacity to
provide – and produce – technical
information, and the organization’s
instruments to reduce the asymmetries
of its member states (BACCARINI, 2010,
p.9). Based on the provision of the UN
Charter, it is possible to verify that the 5
permanent members concentrate
financial, political and informational
resources.
Regarding the UNSC structure,
one might say that the struggle for
power and the veto power within the
UNSC undermines its interpretation as
the locus of sovereignty in the
international system. However, the
UNSC could still be considered sovereign
to the extent one understands that
there is no other international political
organization with similar authority to
check UNSC's power.
Also, it is sovereign to the degree it
regulates international order by judging
what is security (normality) and what is
not (threat to normality) as well as by
holding the monopoly over the decision
to the legitimate use of force in the
international system.
Kelsen, who defends the
equality between the ruler and the legal
order, recognized that this was not the
case regarding the UNSC. He argued
that:
The veto right of the five permanent
members of the Security Council places
them above the law of the United
Nations, establishes their legal
hegemony over all the other Members,
and thus stamps the Organization with
the mark of an autocratic regime. This
becomes more significant if we keep in
mind the fact that the United Nations
represents itself as the result of a war
not only of arms but of ideals (KELSEN,
1946, p.1121).
It should be highlighted that the
authority of the UNSC to determine the
existence of a threat and to take action
in defense of international peace and
security is derived from the UN Charter,
which has the legal status of a
multilateral treaty (CRONIN, 2008,
p.57).
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Cronin points out that "under
the prevailing theory of international
law - legal positivism - states are
obligated to follow the dictates of the
Council because they have consented to
its authority by signing the Charter"
(CRONIN, 2008, p.57). On the one side,
there is a norm from which the UNSC
derives its authority (legitimacy to
exercise power), and on the other side,
the same norm that legitimizes the
sovereignty of the UNSC also frees the
UNSC of the ties of the norm.
The recognition that there
might be cases that cannot be
anticipated in the norm is clear in the
establishment of the UN Charter. The
sovereignty of the UNSC is not restricted
by the international norm. For some
authors, the decision by the framers of
the Charter not to subject the Council to
the precepts of international law
"suggests that they wanted to avoid
entangling the body in legalisms when
making decisions regarding international
security" (SIMMA et al., 2002, p.52).
Cronin shows that since the
1990s, the significant and most effective
actions of the United Nations Security
Council in the name of the international
security have been in areas that go
beyond the powers granted to the
Council "either by the Charter or by
some other means of expressing
consent: nation-building, prosecuting
war crimes, peacekeeping, dismantling
apartheid, alleviating serious
humanitarian crises, resolving civil wars
and restoring a democratically elected
government" (CRONIN, 2008, p.57).
Besides the authority granted by
the Charter to decide on the exception,
the sovereign power of the UNSC is also
defined by its authority to decide what
constitute legitimate use of force in
international politics. Even the right to
self–defense is restricted to an
immediate moment after the attack.
Article 51 clearly states that attacks
should be reported to the UNSC as soon
as possible and should not affect the
Council’s authority to decide on the
matter. Articles 41 and 42 indicate some
of the measures that might be
considered by the UNSC in cases of
threat to international security. Article
41 establishes that:
The Security Council may decide what
measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect
to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42 extends the power of
the United Nations Security Council to
use coercive force when necessary:
Should the Security Council consider that
measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to
be inadequate, it may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such
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action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air,
sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
The member states agree, by
ratifying the UN Charter to provide the
necessary forces to 'restore order and
security'. Article 43 asserts that all
members of the United Nations must
"undertake to make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in
accordance with a special agreement or
agreements, armed forces, assistance,
and facilities, including rights of passage,
necessary for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and
security". Even though in practice one
might question the real authority of the
UNSC to coerce member States to
contribute with their forces in the name
of international security, the authority
granted by the international community,
represented by 193 member States, to
this deliberative organ is still relevant.
In the next section, we analyze
the implications of the campaign for a
reform of the UNSC. We argue that this
could open up the space for a genuine
political debate to the degree that it
challenges the universality of the United
Nations’ principles and rules, as well as
the legitimate authority of the
permanent members of the UN organ to
keep deciding on what constitutes
normal behaviors and subjectivities in
the international sphere. The reasons
that have been raised to justify the need
for a reform of the UNSC sheds light on
the power struggles, the exclusions and
inclusions, and the judgments behind
the institutionalization and
‘normalization’ of the international
structure.
The political and the struggle for power
For Schmitt, the distinction
between “Us” and “Them” is at the core
of the political. It is what renders the
political necessary. Even though this
dichotomy friend/enemy implies a
territorial notion of the inside according
to Schmitt, the question of whether or
not the location of political life is clearly
bounded opens the possibility for one to
reflect on the inside/outside at an
international level. As Walker
contends, "what we call politics must be
becoming something other than what
we expect it to be as an expression of
the necessities and possibilities of the
sovereign state" (WALKER, 2006, p.56).
If the states are no longer the primary
or the only providers of our political
identities, we may find other locales
where our political identities are been
constituted. By the same token, we
identify the constitution of new political
spatialities and subjectivities, and
subsequently, the authorization of a
doubled outside. The United Nations
Security Council claims to represent and
to speak on behalf of a specific
collectivity. The work of the United
Nations reaches every corner of the
globe, as is stated on the United Nations
website (www.un.org). There is a "we,
the peoples of the United Nations" who
is represented by the institution and
also said to be
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protected by it. However, at the same
time that the United Nations defines
the 'We' who is protected, it also
distinguishes it from the 'They' against
whom 'We' must be protected. Since
Article 4 restricts membership to those
entities that are “peace-loving States”,
those who threaten this order of
stability are no longer suitable for
being part of the “We”. The enemy will
be recognized in everything that
potentially disrupts the 'normality' of
international affairs, including
alternative subjectivities that threaten
the ones in alignment with modern
international politics.
Drawing on this interpretation
of the insides and outsides of the
international, our argument is that the
hesitance on the part of the actual
permanent members to welcome the
inclusion of new permanent members
in the United Nations Security Council
is not sufficiently explained at the
institutional or technical level. It
involves a struggle among political
identities and the threat posed by a
normative rearrangement.
Most of claims for a reform of
the UNSC criticize the incompatibility
between a structure created at the
post-Second World War period and
the contemporary multipolar and
more diverse system. The narrative is
that the international sphere has
evolved and the UNSC is paralyzed in
both temporal and spatial dimensions.
The end of the Cold War is considered
one of the most significant
phenomena in relation to which such
arguments based on ‘historical change’
are reinforced.
Following the disintegration of
the Soviet Union, two proposals for a
reform were elaborated. One was
sponsored by the United States
delegation and was known as “quick-
fix”. By this rapid adjustment, the US
suggested that two new permanent
members should be allowed to join the
UNSC with veto power: Japan and
Germany. Another attempt came from
Razali Ismail, Malaysian Ambassador
and former President of the General
Assembly of the United Nations. Razali
offered a model with 5 new
permanent members, with a caveat
that 2 should be developed countries
and 3 should come from the
developing world. His proposal was
called “2+3”. According to Valle
(2005), the assumption that Japan
would be included in any reform was
an insuperable obstacle for China,
which expressed its discontent with
both proposals in its early stages. It
followed that neither proposal was
formally discussed or opened to a
vote.
The twenty-first century
brought hope that the UN would adapt
to the new era. The 09/11 and the
War on Terror that followed helped to
expose the organization’s inability to
deal with a world in constant
transformation. To face these
challenges, the former Secretary-
General Kofi Annan assembled in 2003
a group of specialists to make
recommendations for the UN.
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This High-Level Panel launched
a report in 2005 that contained,
among other suggestion, two
proposals specifically for the UNSC. In
both suggestions, the Panel
recommended an increase in
membership, with no mention to
which states would occupy the new
seats. It also emphasized that the veto
power should not be extended to the
new permanent members. Such
restriction was due to the political use
of vetoes in cases of massive violation
of human rights in the previous
decades. The report stated:
Neither model involves any expansion
of the veto or any Charter modification
of the Security Council’s existing
powers. We recognize that the veto
had an important function in
reassuring the United Nations most
powerful members that their interests
would be safeguarded. We see no
practical way of changing the existing
members’ veto powers. Yet, as a whole
the institution of the veto has an
anachronistic character that is
unsuitable for the institution in an
increasingly democratic age and we
would urge that its use be limited to
matters where vital interests are
genuinely at stake. We also ask the
permanent members, in their
individual capacities, to pledge
themselves to refrain from the use of
the veto in cases of genocide and
large-scale human rights abuses. We
recommend that under any reform
proposal, there should be no expansion
of the veto (UNGA, 2004, p.81).
In addition to this concern
regarding the use of veto power, the
member states also engaged in
constant debates about the shape of
the reformed UNSC. Those who
considered themselves entitled for the
‘vacant’ seats sought to establish
alliances to encourage and strengthen
their candidacies. One strategy that
has been employed is the formation of
coalitions among member States. In
2004, Brazil, India, Japan and Germany
formally joined in a coalition called G4.
The group presented an alternative
reform proposal to the General
Assembly (A/59/L.64), cosponsored by
another 23 states. According to the G4
document, the number of members at
the UNSC should increase to 25, with
the extra 10 divided into 6 new
permanent and 4 non-permanent
members.
The 4 new non-permanent
members should be from Africa, Asia,
Eastern Europe, and Latin America and
the Caribbean, regions that are
considered underrepresented. The 6
new permanent members should fit a
regional distribution of two Asian
states, one from Latin America and the
Caribbean, one from Western Europe
and two from Africa. In this model, all
G4 members could have their
candidacy contemplated, along with
two African states. Although the
proposal reaffirmed that the new
permanent members would share the
same duties and responsibilities of the
current ones, article 5 mentions the
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extension of the veto power. The
article establishes that the new
permanent members would not have
the veto prerogative immediately, and
this modus operandi should be
reassessed in 15 years. During this
period, the P5 should refrain from
using the veto.
The G4 countries have
gathered in several opportunities,
including on the margins of the
General Assembly Opening Sessions
and during the meeting of the
Assembly’s Open-ended Working
Group on the question of equitable
representation and increase in the
membership of the Security Council. In
February of 2011, Brazil, India,
Germany and Japan issued a joint
statement on the UNSC reform. The
G4 reinstated their main goal to
support each other's bids for a
permanent seat, and to also include
African states. In this joint statement,
they summarize their vision:
Recalling also their previous joint
statements, the Ministers reiterated
their common vision of a reformed
Security Council, taking into
consideration the contributions made
by countries to the maintenance of
international peace and security and
other purposes of the organization, as
well as the need for increased
representation of developing countries
in both categories, in order to better
reflect today’s geopolitical realities
(G4, 2011).
The campaign for a reform of
the UNSC is mainly directed towards
the legitimacy of this political body by
the fact that it still reflects a political
configuration that dates back to more
than 70 years ago. The supporters of
the reform understand that the power
structure of UNSC is a frozen structure
of power that reflects that of the end
of World War II. Since 1945, the
number of member states in the
United Nations has increased from 51
to 193, but the only change in the
configuration of this UN organ has
been an increase in the number of
non-permanent members from 6 to 9
in 1965.
At the core of the argument
for a reform, we find the issue of
legitimacy, which involves both a
debate on the representativeness of
the UNSC as well as on the legitimacy
of the current normative order. In a
speech to the United Nations in 2004,
former-Brazilian president Lula
sustained that
No organ is better suited than the UN
for ensuring the world's convergence
towards common goals. The Security
Council is the only source of legitimate
action in the field of international
peace and security. But its composition
must reflect today's reality”. Lula also
argued that "there will be neither
security nor stability in the world until
a more just and democratic order is
established (DA SILVA, 2004).
On the one hand, Lula's
discourse acknowledges the legitimacy
of the
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United Nations to preserve world
order. The Brazilian government has
not advocated for the extinction of the
UNSC. Also, it has not questioned its
decision-making power to define who
is inside and outside of the norm.
What the Brazilian government
suggested was a change in the
decision-making mechanism within
UNSC. Brazil and the others in the G4
coalition accused the UNSC of a lack of
representativeness, what hinders its
legitimacy. In his first statement at the
UN General Assembly General Debate
as the President of Brazil, Lula asserted
that
its [UNSC] decisions must be seen as
legitimate by the Community of
Nations as a whole. Its composition - in
particular as concerns permanent
membership - cannot remain unaltered
almost 60 years on. It can no longer
ignore the changing world. More
specifically, it must take into account
the emergence in the international
scene of developing countries. They
have become important actors that
often exercise a critical role in ensuring
the pacific settlement of disputes (DA
SILVA, 2003).
More recently, President
Dilma Rousseff was applauded when
she advocated a reform of the UNSC in
the opening speech of the General
Debate of the 66th General Assembly
of the United Nations. She sustained
that “the more legitimate its [UNSC]
decisions are, the better it will be able
to play its role. [...] With each passing
year, it becomes more urgent to solve
the Council’s lack of
representativeness, which undermines
its credibility and effectiveness”
(ROUSSEFF, 2011).
Over the last decade, G4
countries have continued to highlight
the issue of representation and
legitimacy as a core demand regarding
UNSC reform. In 2017, the German
Ambassador at the UN made a
statement in which he reiterated the
need for reform, based on the
importance of a configuration that
reflects 21st century realities, in order
to ensure its authority and relevance
(HEUSGEN, 2017). In the 2017 G4 Joint
Statement, the Ambassador of Japan
also pointed to the issue of credibility,
by showing that 164 of the current 193
UN member States agreed to engage
on text-based negotiation to reform
the UNSC (G4, 2017).
The debate on the reform of
the UNSC politicizes the international
by bringing to the fore the struggle for
power that defines the constitution of
the system. The campaign
denaturalizes the 'normalized'
international order. In this sense, the
campaign for a reform of the UNSC can
be interpreted as a declared fight
against the current rules of power, in
particular those directly regulating
criteria about who gets to rule within
and above the norm in international
politics. However, as explored in this
paper, a Schmittian interpretation of
sovereignty is limiting if it does not
take into account the
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source of its legitimacy. The campaign
for a reform of the UNSC exposes not
only the struggle for the power to rule
over the norm of international politics,
but mainly a dispute over the norms
according to which certain
subjectivities are positioned in a
privileged position from where they
are able to speak and decide
legitimately and intelligibly for “the
peoples of the world”.
Conclusion
While the debate on the
reform of the UNSC politicizes the
institution - by recognizing historical
and geographical biases behind the
UNSC's monopoly of the last decision
on the cases of exception in the
international, an actual reform has the
potential to depoliticize it, to hide yet
again history, processes, practices, and
biases behind a newly reformed
‘democratic’ constitution. Additionally,
the democratization of the UNSC may
also not satisfy Kelsen's notion of a
positive international law, as far as the
UNSC remains a political body holding
the monopoly over the political
decision in the international system,
and not a mere bureaucratic organ -
detached from human judgment and
decision - that relies on the science of
law.
As we have shown, even
amongst the five permanent
members, the asymmetry of power in
the decision-making process is
manifest. At the creation of the UNSC,
the five permanent members
protected themselves from the ties of
legalisms. The stories about the
constitution of the United Nations and
its different organs and the recent
campaign for a reform of UNSC show
us that the ability to distinguish
between ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality
in international politics, or ‘legitimate’
and ‘illegitimate’ political structures,
depends on historical context, as it
relies on meaning making processes
and certain rules of intelligibility
conditioning the recognition and
performance of authority as such. In
that sense, the ‘sovereign’ is never
above pre-existing set of discursive
and representational rules. A deeper
investigation of future possibilities
opened up by the debate on the
reform of the UNSC should take into
account the constitution of new
political spatialities and subjectivities
as well as new rules of intelligibility
enabling and enabled by a new
organizational structure.
The questions and
controversies highlighted by this
article inspire new research agendas
that could contribute to the
development of International
Relations as a discipline as well as to
more informed enquiries about the
subject of international norms and
institutions. By engaging conversations
and debates at the intersection of
International and Political Theory, it
remains vital to analyze more deeply if
the current (in)balances of power and
the unilateral actions that have been
https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/sg 33
Francine R. de Paula and Marianna R.A. de Albuquerque
UN security Council Reform: the political and the desire to be seized of the matter
progressively undervaluing multilateral
decision-making arenas could be read
as a movement towards the
politicization of the international order
and/or the reterritorialization of the
sovereign decision, and what this
could mean in terms of new
opportunities and limitations that are
presented to actors that have been
historically silenced by pervasive and
normalizing rules of power and
legitimacy on the global stage.
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Notes
1- France did note participate in
most of the war conferences
because it was either occupied by
Nazi troops or the government was
in exile.
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Abstract
The international political order
has been 'normalized' through a
number of principles that constitute our
international legal and normative
framework. The United Nations became
one of the main sources of legitimacy
informing the relation between states.
This paper explores the role of United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the
universalization of rules and principles,
and as a sovereign center where
decisions on the normal and abnormal
behaviors and subjectivities in the
international are made. By identifying
and regulating what constitutes the
exception to the rule and to
international peace and security, the
permanent members of the UNSC find
themselves in a position to also define
the limits of normality in international
politics. Developing further on these
premises, we argue that the campaign
for a reform of the UNSC sheds light on
the political domain of the




A ordem internacional foi
'normalizada’ por meio de vários
princípios que constituem a estrutura
legal e normativa internacional, e as
Nações Unidas se tornaram uma das
principais fontes legitimadoras da
relação entre os Estados. Este artigo
examina o papel do Conselho de
Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU)
na universalização de regras e princípios
e como órgão soberano onde são
tomadas decisões sobre
comportamentos e subjetividades
considerados adequados no cenário
internacional . Ao identificar e regular o
que constitui a exceção à regra e à paz
e segurança internacionais, os membros
permanentes do CSNU encontram-se
em posição de definir também os
limites da normalidade na política
internacional. Desenvolvendo ainda
mais essas premissas, argumentamos
que a campanha para uma reforma do
CSNU lança luz sobre o domínio político
da "ordem internacional", um domínio
de disputa, incertezas e
potencialidades.
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